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Morgan vs. State of Nevada., 134 Nev. Adv. Op. 27 (May 3, 2018)1
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: ERRORS THAT REQUIRE DISSMISAL OF CHARGES
Summary
The Court determined that a defendant is not entitled to cross examine examiners who find
him incompetent at a competency hearing where neither party subpoenaed the examiner to appear
at said competency hearing. The Court further decided that the State’s failure to transport an
incompetent Defendant to competency treatment within seven days of receiving a court order did
not warrant the dismissal of charges against the Defendant. The Court also held that the District
Court did not commit a structural error when Defendant moved to strike the jury venire. The Court
went on to decide that Defendant was not entitled to a new jury venire when the Defendant fails
to show that the underrepresentation of a distinctive group meets the requirements articulated in
Williams v. State.2 The Court further determined that the District Court did not abuse its discretion
in determining how voir dire was conducted when the Court asks peremptory questions of the
potential jurists before the parties could strike jurors for cause or use their peremptory challenges.
The Court held that a party may not strike a juror based on the juror’s sexual orientation, but that
a party may strike a juror for non-discriminatory reasons. The Court further decided that the district
court did not err in correcting Morgan’s counsel’s closing statements when counsel misstated a
fact. Finally, the Court found that there was sufficient evidence to uphold Morgan’s ultimate
conviction.
Background
The State charged Morgan with one count of robbery and one count of battery after Morgan
stole various goods from a convenience store and pushed an employee (Maria). On December 1,
2014, Morgan was removed from his initial arraignment hearing for spitting and a competency
hearing was set for later that month. At the competency hearing, one examiner determined that
Morgan was competent to stand trial while the other examiner determined Morgan was not
competent to stand trial. A third examiner found Morgan to be competent to stand trial. Morgan
challenged his competency by requesting another hearing. In February 2015, Morgan called only
one witness to testify at his competency hearing—the examiner who had found him incompetent
to stand trial during his first hearing. Neither Morgan nor the State requested to have the other two
examiners from the first hearing present at the second hearing. The district court determined that
Morgan was competent to stand trial. Morgan’s counsel subsequently requested another
competency hearing. At the third competency hearing, two examiners found Morgan to be
incompetent to stand trial, and the district court ordered that he be transferred to Lake’s Crossing
Center so that he may be treated and later able to stand trial. After 100 days, Morgan had still not
been transferred. Morgan filed a motion to dismiss the charges against him based on this delay.
The district court denied the motion.
In February 2016, Morgan’s trial took place. During jury selection, Morgan moved to strike
the jury venire and requested an evidentiary hearing after only three African-Americans were
selected for the forty-five person venire. While the district court initially denied this motion, it
later granted the motion for an evidentiary hearing after one of the African-American venire
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members was ineligible to serve on the jury. After the evidentiary hearing the district court once
again denied Morgan’s motion.
The district court conducted voir dire. The district court explained that it would first ask
the jury panel general questions. The Court would then seat thirteen members and the parties could
ask the jurors questions. The parties were then permitted to strike jurors for cause. After striking
for cause, each party was permitted to use peremptory challenges. However, if a party failed to
make a peremptory challenge, they lost their opportunity to do so. Morgan challenged this process,
but his challenge was ultimately futile.
The State used one of their peremptory challenges to strike a juror who happened to be a
homosexual. Morgan challenged this strike by claiming that it was based on the juror’s sexual
orientation. Finally, during closing arguments, the district court required Morgan to correct his
statement that Maria was still a manager at the convenience store he robbed. The jury ultimately
found Morgan guilty of the charges the State had brought against him.
Discussion
The district court did not err with respect to Morgan’s competency hearing
Morgan claimed that the district court violated his constitutional right to due process and
his right to cross-examine at his second competency hearing because he was unable to cross
examine the two examiners who found him competent at his first competency hearing. The Court
rejected this argument. The Court first noted that the district court ultimately found Morgan to be
incompetent at his third competency hearing. The Court further stated that Morgan had not
objected to the two examiners in question not being present at his second competency hearing. The
Court stated that since Morgan had not objected below, they would review for plain error.
The Court found that, pursuant to Scarbo v. Eighth Judicial District,3 since neither party
had subpoenaed the two examiners in question to be present at the second competency hearing,
the law did not require either party to be present at the hearing. The Court noted that Morgan’s
right to cross-examine only applies to witnesses present at the hearing. The Court also noted that
Morgan’s counsel had been presented with all the examiner’s finding prior to the hearing, and thus
Morgan had the opportunity to subpoena these experts if he wished. The fact is simply that Morgan
failed to do so. The Court therefore held that there was no structural error, and the district court
did not err with respect to Morgan’s competency hearing.
The district court did not err by rejecting Morgan’s motion to dismiss the charges
The Court noted that following a consent decree, the State had been ordered to transport
Morgan to competency treatment within seven days of receiving the court order. However, the
State waited over one hundred days before transporting Morgan. Morgan argued that this violated
his due process rights under the fourteenth amendment and moved to have the charges against him
dismissed.
The Court noted that it grants broad discretion to the district court on whether to dismiss
charges and will not disturb a decision not to dismiss charges absent an abuse of discretion. The
Court noted that in the present instance, the district court had to balance its deterrent interest with
the interest of society in prosecuting those who violate its laws. The Court noted that the decision
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to dismiss charges with prejudice is an extreme remedy, and usually requires aggravating
circumstances. The Court found that here, aggravating circumstances did not exist, and therefore
the district court did not err in rejecting Morgan’s motion to dismiss.
The district court did not err with respect to jury selection
The Court noted that Morgan made four contentions regarding jury selection. Morgan
argued that: (1) the district court should not have made a ruling on his motion to strike jury venire
before having an evidentiary hearing; (2) he was entitled to a new jury venire; (3) the district court
abused its discretion in conducting voir dire; and (4) the district court erred in overruling his Batson
challenge. The Court analyzed each of these contentions separately.
The district court did not commit structural error when Morgan moved to strike the jury
venire.
The Court stated that they review whether a district court’s decision constitutes structural
error de novo. The Court noted that they have previously held that “when a defendant moves the
court to strike jury venire, and the district court determines that an evidentiary hearing is warranted,
it is structural error for the court to deny the defendant’s challenge before holding that hearing to
determine the merits of the motion.”4 Morgan submitted his motion for an evidentiary hearing and
to strike the jury venire after learning that one of the three African-American jurists had been found
to be ineligible to serve on the jury.
The district court set up an evidentiary hearing despite knowing that the jury commissioner
had not inquired about race, creed, or color. Following the evidentiary hearing, the Court denied
Morgan’s motion to strike the jury venire. The Court found that based on the district court’s
actions, the standard set forth in Buchanan was met, and therefore the district court did not commit
structural error.
Morgan was not entitled to a new venire.
Morgan argued that he was entitled to a new venire because based on the racial makeup of
Clark County, the venire should have included five African-Americans, but only included three.
The Court stated that in deciding whether the venire violated Morgan’s Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendment right to “a venire selected from a fair cross section of the community” the Defendant
must show that (1) the group that was excluded is a distinctive group, (2) that the representation
of this group in the venire is neither fair nor reasonable, and (3) that the unfair or unreasonable
exclusion is based in systematic exclusion in the jury-selection process.5
The Court stated that the two parties agreed that the first prong of the test was met, as
African-Americans are undoubtedly a distinctive group. However, the Court found that the
representation was fair and reasonable after calculating absolute and comparative disparities
pursuant to the ruling in Evans v. State.6 The Court found that in the present instance, this prong
had not been satisfied as there was only an absolute disparity of 5.1% and comparative disparity
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of 43.2%. Thus, Morgan’s venire did not violate his right to a venire selected from a fair cross
section of the community. The Court therefore held that Morgan was not entitled to a new venire.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining the manner in which voir dire
was conducted.
Morgan argued that the district court erred in not allowing him to use all his peremptory
challenges on the worst jurors. Morgan conceded, however, that many courts use the peremptory
challenge system that the district court employed. Morgan primarily asserts that it was
unreasonable for the Court to force him to use his peremptory challenges without knowing the next
juror in the pool that would take the excluded juror’s place. The Court disagreed. The Court
reasoned that since the district court had asked the entire jury panel twenty general questions before
the parties questioned the jury pool themselves and started using their challenges, the parties were
sufficiently aware of the candidates that would likely take the place of any stricken juror. The
Court thus determined that Morgan was not unreasonably restricted in using his peremptory
challenges. The Court therefore held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
determining the manner in which voir dire was conducted.
The district court properly overruled Morgan’s Batson challenge.
Morgan made a Batson challenge against the state’s decision to strike juror No. 24, one of
the two identifiable gay members of the jury. The Court noted that although the district court never
determined whether Morgan had presented a prima face of discrimination, it denied the challenge
anyway. The Court first took a moment to hold that sexual orientation should be recognized under
Batson (a matter of first impression for the Court).
The Court then went on to apply the three-step analysis articulated in Batson.7 The Court
stated that under such an analysis, (1) the opponent of a challenge must make a prima facie case
of discrimination, (2) the proponent of the challenge then bears the burden of asserting a neutral
reason for the challenge, and (3) the trial court must determine whether the opponent has proven
“purposeful discrimination.”8 The Court determined that Morgan failed to make out a prima facie
case of discrimination. The Court considered various factors in coming to this conclusion such as:
The State did not use a peremptory strike against the other identifiably gay member of the jury,
the nature of the State’s questions and statements and questions during voir dire did not suggest
any discriminatory intent, and finally, that the crime at issue did not involve as issue particularly
sensitive to the gay community.
The Court went on to note that even if Morgan had met his burden under the first step of
the analysis, the State asserted a neutral reason for wanting to exclude juror No. 24. Primarily, the
State asserted that it was concerned by the potential juror’s approval of the media’s criticism of
the police. Therefore, the Court held that the district court properly overruled Morgan’s Batson
challenge.
The district court did not err with respect to closing arguments
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During Morgan’s counsel’s closing argument, he stated that Maria was still a manager at
the store Morgan allegedly robbed. The State objected, as evidence that Maria was still a manager
there had not been introduced at trial. The district court instructed Morgan to correct his statement
to the jury. Morgan argued that this instruction violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
The Court noted that Maria had testified at the trial, and neither party had asked her whether
she was still a manager at the store. Thus, there was no evidence that Maria was still the manager
at the store. The Court therefore held that the district court did not err when it instructed Morgan
to revise his statement because his statement was inaccurate based on the facts presented at trial.
There was sufficient evidence for Morgan’s conviction
Morgan argued that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction because the
State failed to present any evidence that the Store was missing any inventory. However, the Court
found that there was enough evidence presented in the form of video surveillance and testimony
that a reasonable fact finder could find the essential elements of the crime. The Court pointed out
that the State’s evidence included video surveillance of Morgan committing the alleged crime, the
store manager’s testimony, and the arresting police officer’s testimony. The Court held that based
on this evidence, there was sufficient evidence for Morgan’s conviction.
Conclusion
The Court was presented with many issues of criminal procedural law, and held that (1)
the district court did not err during Morgan’s competency hearing, (2) the district court did not err
in rejecting Morgan’s motion to dismiss the charges brought against him, (3) that the district court
did not err during the jury selection process, (4) that the Court did not err regarding Morgan’s
counsel’s closing arguments, and (5) that there was sufficient evidence for Morgan’s conclusion.
Of particular importance is that the Court also determined, as a matter of first impression, that
discrimination under Batson includes discrimination based on sexual orientation.

